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Abstract
This paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that
in …rst price auctions, overbidding with respect to risk neutral Nash
equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret (felt when
bidders lose at an a¤ordable price). Di¤erent information structures
are created to elicit regret: bidders know they will learn the winning
bid if they lose (loser regret condition); or the second highest bid
if they win (winner regret condition); or no information regarding
the other bids. Bidders only in loser regret condition anticipated
regret and signi…cantly overbid; in the other conditions bidders did
not anticipate regret and hence did not overbid. (JEL D44, C91)
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1Why do we observe overbidding in ￿rst price private value auctions? This paper aims to
answer this question, which has been extensively studied in the literature, from a nonstandard
point of view.
William Vickrey (1961) derived the risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bidding behav-
ior in ￿rst price sealed bid auctions. However, bidding higher than the RNNE (overbidding)
in ￿rst price private value auctions is one of the consistent ￿ndings of the experimental liter-
ature (see James C. Cox, Bruce Roberson and Vernon L. Smith, 1982; Cox, Smith and James
M. Walker, 1988, as the seminal papers; and John H. Kagel, 1995, for a detailed survey).
Cox, Smith and Walker (1988) explained this phenomena by risk aversion. The intuition is
simple: risk averse bidders bid higher to increase the chance of winning even if this decreases
their payo⁄. Although risk aversion is a widely accepted explanation for overbidding, there
is no consensus for the risk aversion explanation. Glenn W. Harrison (1989) argued that
bidders deviate from RNNE because of the low monetary cost of deviation, i.e. in the exper-
iment by bidding more bidders increased their probability of winning substantially but the
amount they gave up was very small in monetary terms. So, he concluded that overbidding
was observed because of lack of incentives not to deviate. However, Cox, Smith and Walker
(1992) and Daniel Friedman (1992) highlighted the theoretical problems in Harrison￿ s cri-
tique, and they concluded that Harrison￿ s reasoning was not su¢ cient enough to explain
the overbidding (see also Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, 1992; and Antonio Merlo and Andrew
Schotter, 1992, for additional shortcomings of Harrison￿ s critique). Nevertheless, there is no
consensus on the risk aversion explanation of the overbidding puzzle (see e.g. Kagel and Dan
Levin, 1993, for overbidding in third-price auction with respect to the RNNE which goes
against the implications of risk aversion in such a setting). The reason of wide acceptance of
2risk aversion despite of its problems seems that other proposed explanations, such as joy of
winning, are not powerful enough to explain to experimental ￿ndings in comparison to risk
aversion explanation (see e.g. Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt and Thomas R. Palfrey,
2002).
This paper tries to shift the focus of discussion from risk aversion. We o⁄er a di⁄erent
explanation of overbidding, namely anticipated regret.
The underlying motive of this paper is that in a game with incomplete information what
seems as the best action ex-ante may not turn out to be the best one ex-post (after the
information is revealed). Auctions are typical examples to observe such a discrepancy. For
example, consider a ￿rst price private value auction in which a bidder values an object $1,000
and bids $900. At the end of the auction, he learns not only that he is the highest bidder
but also that the second highest bid is $50. Although bidding $900 might be the best bid
ex-ante, it is de￿nitely not the best bid ex-post, e.g. bidding $51 still makes him win and
pay less. In this situation, the fact that ex-ante best bid is no longer the best bid ex-post will
make him regret his ex-ante decision. Since this regret may be experienced by the winner
only, we will call it "winner regret".
The above scenario is not the only way that regret can be felt in an auction. Consider
the above situation again, but this time after he bids $900, he learns that he lost the object
because the highest bid was $901. Again, bidding $900 is not the best bid ex-post because
he could have won the object in a pro￿table way by bidding $902. Since this regret may be
felt by the losing bidders only, we will call it "loser regret".
Intuitively, if the bidders anticipate that they are going to feel winner regret, they will
shade their bids. In contrast, if their anticipation is loser regret, then they will overbid. In
3this paper, ￿rst we theoretically show that these intuitions are indeed equilibrium behaviors
of risk neutral bidders with regret concerns. However, this theory is built on the assumption
that bidders do anticipate regret. In this direction, we conduct experiments to answer
whether they anticipate regret and if so, whether they re￿ ect them into the bids.
The relevance of feedback regarding the bids of the others was initially studied by R. Mark
Isaac and Walker (1985). They provided two types of feedback to di⁄erent groups: one group
is informed about the winning bid, the other is informed about all the submitted bids. In
our terminology, the bidders in the ￿rst group may have loser regret, while the bidders in the
second group may have both winner and loser regret. They observed higher bids in the ￿rst
group. Similarly, Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten (2005) was also interested in the e⁄ect
of feedback on bidding. They compared ￿rst price sealed bid auctions in which the winner
was informed about all the losing bids and auctions with no feedback regarding the other
bids. In our terminology, the bidders in the ￿rst group may feel winner regret, while the ones
in the no feedback group may feel no regret. They found that feedback caused lower bids.
Additionally, in the experiment of Cox, Smith and Walker (1988) where overbidding was
observed, participants learnt only the bid of the winner; so the bidders in their experiment
may feel loser regret. Although none of these studies gave regret explanation, our regret
intuition is capable of explaining their ￿ndings.
Secondly, in this paper we argue that if the bidders know that they are going to receive
some feedback, then they re￿ ect it into their bids. The repeated nature of the above men-
tioned experiments does not allow us to answer our argument clearly because in the repeated
setup feedback may create experience dependent regret. In other words, regret felt in the
previous round or simple learning rather than anticipated regret might be the determinant
4of the bids of the next rounds.
Regret is not a novel concept in the economics literature (see Graham Loomes and Robert
Sugden, 1982; and David E. Bell, 1982).1 Regret theory generalizes expected utility theory
by making the Bernoulli utilities depend on not only the payo⁄ of the chosen outcome but
also the payo⁄ of the forgone alternative. Bell (1982) argued that when the uncertainty is
resolved, the comparison between the current state of the chosen alternative and the forgone
alternative may lead to regret. In order to feel regret, the decision maker should learn the
resolution of the uncertainty of the unchosen alternative. Additionally, in order to anticipate
regret, the decision maker should know that she is going to learn this complete resolution
before the decision. To sum up, decisions may be a⁄ected by anticipated regret if the relevant
feedback about the resolution of the uncertainty of alternatives is expected to be received
by the decision maker. A series of lab experiments has shown that indeed anticipated regret
can a⁄ect the behavior of decision makers (see e.g. Ilana Ritov, 1996; and for a detailed
review see Marcel Zeelenberg, 1999).
Both theoretically and experimentally, anticipated emotions have been examined ex-
tensively, but mostly in single decision making problems. The regret in auction setting is
introduced by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989). Here, ￿rstly we will rede￿ne anticipated
regret more clearly by distinguishing two types of regret. Additionally, we will consider a
more general functional form of regret, and we will characterize the symmetric equilibrium
bidding strategy. These are studied in Section I.
In Section II, we will develop a set of ￿rst price sealed bid auction experiments by
changing the information structure of the auctions. More precisely, we conduct experiments
to check if bidders change their bidding strategies in a ￿rst price auction depending on the
5information that can potentially make the bidders anticipate regret. Unlike the standard lab
auction experiments, our design will be one-shot because we want to avoid any learning or
experience dependent regret explanations. In this way, we will also check if overbidding is
observed in a one-shot ￿rst price auction experiment. In Section III, we will argue that our
model is capable of explaining the ￿ndings of our experimental results. In Section IV, in order
to check how introducing regret perturbs the revenue equivalence theorem, we will consider
other well-known auctions, namely second price, English and Dutch auctions. Section V
concludes.
I. Model
There is a single object for sale, and there are N potential bidders, indexed by i = 1;:::;N.
Bidder i assigns a private value of vi to the object. Each vi is independently and identically
drawn from [v;v] according to an increasing distribution function F, and f is the density
function corresponding to F: Let vo be the reservation price of the seller. Without loss of
generality, assume vo = 0:
Suppose the seller sells the object by ￿rst-price sealed bid auction (FP), i.e. until a
prespeci￿ed deadline, the participants submit their bids in sealed envelopes and the highest
bidder gets the object at the price he o⁄ered by his bid. Assume that any tie is broken by
assigning the object to one of the highest bidders, randomly.
The traditional auction theory speci￿es the utility of a risk neutral bidder as the di⁄erence
between his valuation of the object and the amount he pays if he wins; and zero otherwise.
We generalize the traditional theory such that the information bidders receive at the end
of the auction about the bids submitted in the auction may a⁄ect their utilities. In other
6words, at the end of the auction, the bidder may reevaluate his bid and his position in the
auction when he receives the feedback. We modify the utility function used in the traditional
theory such that this reevaluation may cause regret about the decision of the bidder, and
the regret term may appear in the utility. This modi￿cation in utility makes the rational
bidders anticipate regret and determine their bidding strategies accordingly.
The subsections below analyzes two possible forms of regret, winner and loser regret, in
FP:
A. Winner Regret in First Price Sealed Bid Auction
Suppose at the end of the auction, bidders know not only their winning/losing position but
also if they win, they learn the submitted second highest bid. The utility of a winner depends
on his valuation of the object, the price he pays and the regret he feels. The winner regret is
a function of the di⁄erence between actual payment (his bid) and the minimum amount that
would preserve his winning position after he learned the other bids. Notice that in a FP, the
lower bound of the bids a winner can make while keeping his winning position after he learns
the other bids is the second highest one. Any bid above this lower bound guarantees him
to win ex-post. Additionally, the closer the bids to this lower bound as long as it is higher
than the bound, the smaller the payment the winner makes. So the source of winner regret
is going to be the di⁄erence between his winning bid and the second highest bid. Since the
bidders who did not get the object does not have access to any information, the utility form
for losers is as in the traditional theory. More formally, the utility function of bidder i; with
valuation vi and bid bi, in ￿rst-price sealed bid auction takes the following form:
7ui (vi;bijb2) =
8
> > <
> > :
vi ￿ bi ￿ h(bi ￿ b2) if i wins
0 if i loses
where b2 is the second highest bid and h(￿) : R+ ! R+ is the winner regret function.
Since regret is a negative emotion that may decrease the utility, assume that h is nonnegative
valued. Additionally, if a bidder wins the object with a tie then ex-post he may not feel
any regret because by bidding any smaller amount he would lose or any bigger amount he
would pay more, so assume h(0) = 0. The bigger the discrepancy between the actual bid and
the ex-post best bid is, the more regret may be felt, therefore assume h is a nondecreasing
function. Finally, for technical reasons, assume h is di⁄erentiable.
Observe that in the above formulation setting h(￿) = 0, i.e. assuming that bidders do not
have winner regret concerns, our model is equivalent to the traditional risk neutral bidder
setting.
Intuitively, in our model since the winner￿ s monetary payo⁄ is shaded by regret, we
should expect, in the equilibrium, lower bids than those in the traditional risk neutral case.
Knowing that some ex-post regret may be experienced, the individuals may be afraid of
bidding too aggressively.
Theorem 1 In a ￿rst price sealed bid auction with winner regret, the symmetric equilibrium
bidding strategy (bFPwr(￿) : [v;v] ! [0;1)) must satisfy the following condition:
(1) EX[XjX < v] = b
FPwr(v) + EX[h(b
FPwr(v) ￿ b
FPwr(X))jX < v]
where X is the highest of N ￿ 1 values.
8Proof. The symmetric equilibrium incentive compatible (IC) bidding strategy for FP with
winner regret is an increasing function of valuation of the bidder. Since this result can be
proven in the standard way generally used in auction problems, we ignore it here.
Consider any representative bidder motivated by winner regret and participating in a
￿rst price auction. Let b(￿) be his optimum incentive compatible bidding strategy. If we
consider the symmetric equilibrium (hence the identity index of bidder can be dropped) and
solve the problem in an incentive compatible way then the solution to the following problem
gives the optimal bid:
max
w EU(v;b(w)) = max
w P(win)[v ￿ b(w) ￿ E[h(b(w) ￿ b(X))jX < w]]
= max
w G(w)fv ￿ b(w) ￿ E[h(b(w) ￿ b(X))jX < w]g
= max
w G(w)
8
> > > <
> > > :
v ￿ b(w) ￿
w R
[
v
h(b(w) ￿ b(X))G0(X)]d(X)
G(w)
9
> > > =
> > > ;
where G(w) = F(w)N￿1: Above P(win) = G(w) because the equilibrium bid is increasing.
As in the standard analysis of FP, the local and global IC are equivalent in this setting (see
e.g. Vijay Krishna, 2002), and the corresponding ￿rst order condition is:
@EU(v;b(w))
@w
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
w=v
=
0:
G0(v)[v ￿ b(v)] ￿ G(v)b0(v) ￿
v R
v
[h0(b(v) ￿ b(X))b0(v)G0(X)]d(X) = 0
G0(v)v = G0(v)b(v) + b0(v)G(v) + b0(v)
v R
v
[h0(b(v) ￿ b(X))G0(X)]d(X)
The solution of the above di⁄erential equation implicitly solves2
E[XjX < v] = bFPwr(v) + EX[h(bFPwr(v) ￿ bFPwr(X))jX < v]:
9Remark 1 The left hand side of Eq.(1) is the symmetric equilibrium strategy (RNNE) in
a ￿rst price auction in the traditional theory. Hence, in a ￿rst price sealed bid auction with
winner regret, the symmetric equilibrium strategy is less than that of without winner regret,
i.e. bFPwr(v) ￿ bFP(v) for all v 2 [v;v] since h(:) is assumed to be nonnegative. In other
words, if the bidders anticipate winner regret then they will underbid.
Remark 2 Winner regret concerns of the bidders decrease the seller￿ s expected revenue in
FP since the bidding strategy will be lower as explained in Remark 1, i.e. ERFPwr ￿ ERFP:
Hence, the seller prefers bidders not to anticipate winner regret.
B. Loser Regret in First Price Sealed Bid Auction
Suppose at the end of FP, the bidders not only learn their winning/losing position but also if
they lose, they learn the winning bid. The utility of a losing bidder depends on the regret he
feels. The loser regret is a function of the di⁄erence between his valuation and the winning
bid if the winning bid is a⁄ordable, i.e. the winning bid is less than his valuation.
More formally, consider FP with the following change in the form of utility:
ui (vi;bijb
w) =
8
> > <
> > :
vi ￿ bi if i wins
￿g(vi ￿ bw) if i loses
where bw is the highest bid (the bid of the winner), and g(￿) : R ! R+ is the loser
regret function which is assumed to be a nonnegative, nondecreasing, di⁄erentiable real
valued function, analogous to the properties of winner regret function, h(￿): The bigger the
di⁄erence between his value and the winning bid is, the more loser regret may be felt by a
10bidder. Moreover assume g(x) = 0 for all x ￿ 0 because if a bidder loses and learns that
winning bid is not a⁄ordable by him, i.e. vi ￿ bw; then there is no reason for loser regret. In
other words, even if he has bid more than the winning bid, he would not have made positive
pro￿t because that bid would have been more than his valuation. So, when he learns that
the winning bid was greater than or equal to his valuation, he would not feel loser regret.
More precisely, the utility is constructed by modifying the utility in the traditional theory
via introducing loser regret function.
Similar to winner regret, observe that in the above formulation setting g(￿) = 0, i.e. as-
suming that bidders do not have loser regret concerns, our model pins down to the traditional
risk neutral bidder setting.
Intuitively, since in our model the bidders who did not get the object may reevaluate their
bids by considering the winning bid and some of them may regret about their too little bids,
by anticipating the regret possibility, they may end-up bidding more than the traditional
case, i.e. overbidding may be observed if the bidders are motivated by loser regret.
Theorem 2 In a ￿rst price sealed bid auction with loser regret the symmetric equilibrium
bidding strategy (bFPlr(￿) : [v;v] ! [0;1)) must satisfy the following condition:
(2) EX[XjX < v] = b
FPlr(v) ￿ EX[g(X ￿ b
FPlr(X))jX < v]
where X is the highest of N ￿ 1 values.
Proof. The symmetric equilibrium incentive compatible (IC) bidding strategy for FP with
loser regret is an increasing function of valuation of the bidder. Since this result can be
proven in the standard way generally used in auction problems, we ignore it here.
11Any representative bidder with loser regret in FP solves the following expected utility
maximization problem to decide on the optimal incentive compatible bidding strategy:
max
s EU(v;b(s)) = max
s fP(win) ￿ [v ￿ b(s)]
￿P(feeling loser regret) ￿ E[g(v ￿ bw)jb(s) < bw < v]g
= max
s fF N￿1(s) ￿ [v ￿ b(s)]
￿P(b(s) < bw < v) ￿ E[g(v ￿ bw))jb(s) < bw < v]g
= max
s fF N￿1(s) ￿ [v ￿ b(s)]
￿
b￿1(v) R
[
s
g(v ￿ b(y))(N ￿ 1)F N￿2(y)f(y)]d(y)g
where bw is the winning bid.
Same as the standard analysis of FP (see e.g. Krishna, 2002), the local and global IC are
equivalent in this setting, and the corresponding ￿rst order condition is:
@EU(v;b(s))
@s
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
s=v
=
0:
(N ￿ 1)F N￿2(v)f(v)[v ￿ b(v)] ￿ F N￿1(v)b0(v) + g(v ￿ b(v))(N ￿ 1)F N￿2(v)f(v) = 0
(N ￿ 1)F N￿2(v)f(v)v = b(v)(N ￿ 1)F N￿2(v)f(v) + b0(v)F N￿1(v)
￿g(v ￿ b(v))(N ￿ 1)F N￿2(v)f(v)
The solution of above di⁄erential equation implicitly solves3
EX[XjX < v] = bFPlr(v) ￿ EX[g(X ￿ bFPlr(X))jX < v]
where X is a random variable which is a maximum of N-1 random variables.
Remark 3 The left hand side of Eq.(2) is the symmetric equilibrium strategy in a ￿rst price
auction in the standard theory. Hence, in FP with loser regret, the symmetric equilibrium
12strategy is higher than that of standard theory suggests, i.e. bFPlr(v) ￿ bFP(v) for all v 2
[v;v] since g(￿) is assumed to be nonnegative. In other words, if the bidders anticipate loser
regret then they will overbid.
Remark 4 Loser regret concerns of the bidders increase the seller￿ s expected revenue in FP
since the bidding strategy will be higher as explained in Remark 3, i.e. ERFPlr ￿ ERFP:
Hence, the seller prefers bidders to anticipate loser regret.
II. A First Price Auction Experiment
In Section I, we have shown that the winner regret and loser regret have di⁄erent implications
on the equilibrium bidding strategies. In FP, winner regret concern leads to underbidding,
whereas loser regret concern leads to overbidding comparing to the RNNE. Now, the natural
question is if the bidders anticipate any forms of regret and re￿ ect these concerns into
their bids. In order to answer this question, we conduct a FP experiment under di⁄erent
treatments, namely di⁄erent information structures are given so that either form of regret
might be anticipated. More precisely, we will create three conditions which di⁄er only in
terms of information structures. In no-regret condition, the bidders will not learn anything
about others￿bids; in winner regret condition the winner will learn the second highest bid
but the losers will not learn anything; and in loser regret condition, the losers will learn the
winning bid, but the winner will not learn anything. It is important to note that we want
to conduct an experiment to see whether individuals re￿ ect their concern of regret in their
bidding strategies, not to see what they feel after the auction. It is hypothesized that the
bids in the loser regret condition will be higher than that in the no regret condition, and the
bids in the winner regret condition will be lower than that in the no regret condition.
13Regret is a feeling one might experience after the action is taken and the uncertainty of
the forgone actions is also resolved. Therefore, someone facing the same decision problem
in a repeated fashion might re￿ ect the regret of the previous round on the decision of the
next round. However, our theory relies on the fact that bidders anticipate the future regret
and they take this into account in their current decisions. To avoid this history dependent
regret explanation, unlike the standard lab auction experiments, we will conduct a one-shot
auction experiment. However, the problem with running one-shot auction experiment is that
each subject gives a single data which is not possible to estimate the bidding strategy as a
function of all possible valuations. In order to solve this problem, we propose a variation of
the strategy method which we call "bid on list method", in which each subject will give bids
for several di⁄erent valuations. The details of this method will be explained later.
A. Method
The experiments have been run at New York University, the Center for Experimental Social
Science (CESS). All the participants were undergraduate students at New York Univer-
sity. The experiment involved 6 sessions. In each session one of the three conditions was
administered. The number of participants in condition 1, 2, and 3 was 28, 32, and 36, re-
spectively. No subject participated in more than one session. Participants were seated in
isolated booths.4
In our auction experiment, we created groups of 4 bidders and gave each of them a list of
ten possible valuations (see Appendix for a sample of bidding list). The di⁄erent lists were
given to each of the 4 bidders but the same lists were used for each group. Each number on
each list has been drawn uniformly and independently between 0 and 100, rounded to the
14cents, and this was common knowledge for the participants. Additionally, the participants
were informed that only one of those ten numbers in their lists was their correct value but
they did not know which one. They needed to bid for every value they saw in the list as if
it was the correct valuation of the object for them. The participants were told that after
everyone submitted their bids, one valuation would be randomly selected5 and this would
determine the relevant value and bid for each of them. The bidder who had submitted the
highest bid for the selected value won the ￿ctitious good at the price of his bid, and he was
paid in experimental dollars the di⁄erence between his valuation and his bid.6
Each group of 4 bidders were assigned to one of the three di⁄erent conditions. Their
condition were told in a separate page in the instructions in order to make sure that they
read this part of the instructions. The conditions were as follows:
Condition 1 (No regret): It was told to the participants before they bid that at the
end of the auction, they were going to learn if they won or not, and no additional information
would be given.
Condition 2 (Winner regret): It was told to the participants before they bid that at
the end of the auction, they were going to learn if they won or not and if they won, they
would also learn the second highest bid that had been submitted.
Condition 3 (Loser regret): It was told to the participants before they bid that at
the end of the auction, they were going to learn if they won or not and if they did not win,
they would also learn the highest bid that had been submitted.
After each participant had submitted their list of bids, and before determining their
true valuations, a survey adopted from Zeelenberg and Rik Pieters (2004), in which they
were asked to rate the intensity of emotions that they may feel after they get the relevant
15information, was administered (see the appendix for the survey). The ratings are between 1
and 9, where 1 stands for "not at all" and 9 for "very much".
B. Results
For each condition the averages of the bids corresponding to the same valuations were cal-
culated. The average bids for the corresponding valuations are plotted for no regret, winner
regret, and loser regret conditions in Figure 1. The linear estimation of plotted points of each
condition is drawn in the same ￿gure. The slope of the linear estimation (passing through
zero) of the average bids under loser regret is signi￿cantly higher than that under winner
regret (see Table 1, ￿rst two columns) since the interval of lower 95 percent and upper 95
percent of each estimates do not overlap. Similarly, the slope of the linear estimation (pass-
ing through zero) of the average bids under no regret is signi￿cantly lower than that under
loser regret (see Table 1, columns two and three) since the intervals of lower 95 percent and
upper 95 percent of each estimates do not overlap. However there is no signi￿cant di⁄erences
between the no regret and winner regret conditions since the intervals of lower 95 percent
and upper 95 percent of each estimates overlap (see Table 1, columns one and three).
Additionally, the averages of the emotions under each condition is summarized in Table
2. A t-test on the survey data suggests that the average intensity of regret under loser regret
is signi￿cantly higher than that under winner regret (t = 6:2548; p < 0:01).
III. Combining Experimental Results with Theory
In this section, we will try to explain these experimental results with our theory. For this
attempt, we need to determine the RNNE in the traditional theory and take it as a bench-
16mark. This benchmark is going to be used to detect any overbidding/underbidding behavior
if there is any. First of all, the RNNE of a bidder with valuation v is the expected second
highest valuation given that v is the highest, .i.e. b￿(v) = E[X j X < v]: In our setting
with 4 bidders whose valuations are drawn from [0;100] uniformly, this equilibrium bidding
strategy corresponds to the following:
b
￿(v) = :75v
In the loser regret condition, the estimated bidding strategy is b bFPlr = :87v which is
signi￿cantly above RNNE bidding strategy. In other words, overbidding with respect to the
RNNE is observed if the bidders are informed that at the end of the auction they are going
to learn the winning bid if they do not get the object. This is in line with our theoretical
predictions (see Remark 3). However, in the winner regret condition, the estimated bidding
strategy is b bFPwr = :77v which is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from what the RNNE suggests.
Our theory predicts that underbidding needs to be observed in this condition.
The experimental results suggest that bidders anticipate loser regret. Moreover, they re-
￿ ect this anticipated loser regret into their bids and hence overbidding in ￿rst price auction
can be explained by loser regret concern of bidders. However, bidders do not anticipate win-
ner regret, and they do not re￿ ect this concern into their bids. In other words, underbidding
suggested by winner regret motivation has not been observed in the experiment.
At this point it is important to look at the survey ￿ndings because Bell (1982) argues
that regret has to be anticipated by the decision maker in order to be re￿ ected in his deci-
sion. Table 2 indicates that the average intensity of anticipated regret under winner regret
17condition is 2.69 while it is 6.19 under the loser regret condition. Therefore, the bidders
anticipated winner regret signi￿cantly less than loser regret. By taking Bell￿ s argument into
account, bidders who did not anticipate regret may be expected not to re￿ ect it into their
bidding decision. Hence, the absence of anticipation of winner regret may be the reason for
not observing underbidding.
The no information condition is done as a control group. It turns out to be that regret
is not anticipated if they win the auction (since the average intensity of regret has been
reported at 1.39 in Table 2 for this case) and bidding behavior is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from winner regret.
To sum up, the bidders who know that they will be informed about situations which
can potentially cause winner regret do not anticipate winner regret. In our theory not an-
ticipating winner regret formally imposes h(￿) = 0: So, if winner regret is not anticipated,
our theory for winner regret overlaps with the traditional theory. Hence, both the tradi-
tional theory and our theory are capable of explaining bidding behavior under winner regret
condition because they are the same.
On the other hand, under the loser regret condition bidding behavior of subjects signif-
icantly increases. Since the information structure has no role in traditional theory, in the
loser regret condition, the prediction of the RNNE will still be the same and therefore unable
to explain this overbidding phenomena. Nevertheless, by Remark 3, experimental ￿ndings
can be explained by loser regret motivation.
In the theoretical analysis, we found the equilibrium bidding strategy for a general loser
18regret function, g. Now, assume a linear form to estimate the overbidding in the experiment:
(3) g(x) =
8
> > <
> > :
￿x if x ￿ 0
0 o/w
where ￿ ￿ 0.
Applying Theorem 2 for N = 4 with valuations distributed uniformly on [0;100]; the ￿rst
order condition in the proof of the theorem becomes
(4 ￿ 1)v
4￿2[v ￿ b(v)] ￿ v
4￿1b
0(v) + ￿(v ￿ b(v))(4 ￿ 1)v
4￿2 = 0
By solving this, we get the symmetric equilibrium strategy
b
FPlr =
3 + 3￿
4 + 3￿
v:
We can estimate ￿ from the data on bids and values. ￿ can be thought of as a measure
of loser regret. When ￿ = 0 this bidding function is equal to the RNNE bidding function.
Moreover, as ￿ increases this bidding function becomes steeper. In other words, the more
loser regret concerned the bidder is, the higher he bids. As ￿ approaches to 1, i.e. the
bidder is super concerned about loser regret, the optimal bidding strategy is truth telling.
The experimental result suggests that in the loser regret condition, the estimated bidding
strategy is b bFPlr = :87v: By solving
3 + 3b ￿
4 + 3b ￿
v = :87v, the corresponding b ￿ = 1:23 > 0: The
sign of b ￿ matches with the intuition that decision makers act as if they have loser regret
concerns, i.e. g(:) in the model is a non negative function.
19IV. Further Discussions
Vickrey (1961) showed the revenue equivalence among four well-known auctions: ￿rst-price,
second-price sealed bid, English and Dutch auction. Now, we will analyze if anticipation
of regret alters the bidding strategies in other types of auction and how regret disturbs the
revenue equivalence result.
A. Winner Regret in Other Auctions
Suppose the seller sells the object by second price sealed bid auction (SP), i.e. until a
prespeci￿ed deadline, the participants submit their bids in sealed envelopes and the highest
bidder gets the object at the price of the second highest bid. Unlike the ￿rst price, in the
second price sealed bid auction, the winner will not regret about his bid. In this type of
auction, by changing their bids, the bidders can only a⁄ect their winning/losing positions;
in other words there is no bid level that the winner would ex-post prefer to the original
one while maintaining his winning/losing position. Therefore, the di⁄erence between the
payment under the actual bid and that under the ex-post best bid is zero, and since h(0) = 0,
the utility function will not have any regret component in it:
ui (vi;bijb2)=
8
> > <
> > :
vi ￿ b2 ￿ h(b2 ￿ b2) if i wins
0 if i loses
=
8
> > <
> > :
vi ￿ b2 if i wins
0 if i loses
where vi is the value of bidder i, bi is bidder i￿ s bid and b2 is the second highest bid.
Remark 5 Since the utility form remains the same as in the traditional case, the optimal
20bidding strategy will not change in the second price auction. So, it is still optimal to bid
his own valuation as in the traditional theory. Hence, the expected revenue will be unaltered
under winner regret, i.e. ERSP = ERSPwr:
English auction is an ascending price auction in which bidders increase the current price,
and the last remaining bidder receives the object at the amount that no one increases the
price anymore. Similar to SP in English auction, introducing winner regret into the model
does not a⁄ect the form of utility. Obviously, in the ascending auction the winner already
pays the smallest possible amount which makes him the winner. Therefore, he does not
regret at the end.
Dutch auction is a decreasing price auction in which a public price clock starts out at
a high level and falls down until the ￿rst participant accepts to pay it. In Dutch, it is not
possible to de￿ne the e⁄ect of regret because in the descending auction the winner never
learns whether he would have won if he waited a bit more. In our model, the source of regret
is the information that bidders receive about the other bids at the end of the auction. In
the mechanisms, like Dutch, which do not provide this extra information, it is not possible
to talk about regret. Here, we do not want to diverge from the regret theory in which
information regarding the forgone alternative has to be realized in order to consider regret
(see Bell, 1982). However, it is possible to consider regret in expectation which would lead
to similar analysis in the FP.
Remark 6 Since the winner regret does not enter the utility in second price, English and
Dutch auctions, the optimal bidding strategy will be the same as in the traditional case.
Hence, the expected revenue of the seller will be the same whether the bidders have winner
21regret or not. However, due to Remark 2 the expected revenue decreases in FP if the bidders
have winner regret concerns. By combining with Vickrey (1961), the expected revenue in FP
is the lowest among these four auctions, and it is same among second-price, English and
Dutch.
B. Loser Regret in Other Auctions
Unlike the winner regret, the bidders may feel loser regret in SP because for example, a
bidder might bid less than his valuation and might learn that the winning bid is less than his
value. However, this does not happen in the equilibrium because truth-telling is the dominant
strategy for the SP with loser regret as in the traditional theory.
Theorem 3 In a second price sealed bid auction with loser regret the symmetric equilibrium
bidding strategy is bSPlr(v) = v for all v 2 [v;v]:
Proof. For any bidder i the bid bi = vi is a dominant strategy. Consider another action of
player i and call it xi. If max
j6=i
bj ￿ vi then by bidding xi; bidder i either gets the object and
receives a nonpositive payo⁄ or does not get the object and his payo⁄ is ￿g(vi ￿ bw) = 0;
since bw = max
j6=i
bj ￿ vi. While by bidding bi, he guarantees himself a payo⁄ of zero (observe
that if he loses by bidding bi; this will not create loser regret since vi > bw > bi is never a
case). If max
j6=i
bj < vi then by bidding bi; player i obtains the good at the price of max
j6=i
bj;
while bidding xi either he wins and gets the same utility or loses and gets non positive utility
because of loser regret (￿g(vi ￿ bw) ￿ 0 since vi > bw > xi).
Remark 7 Since the equilibrium bidding strategy remains the same as in the traditional
22case as shown in Theorem 3, the expected revenue will be unaltered under loser regret, i.e.
ERSP = ERSPlr:
Unlike the analysis under the winner regret, this time loser regret may be felt in a Dutch
auction because there is no information availability problem in the loser regret case. More
precisely, the ones who lost the object observe the winning bid in Dutch and may reevaluate
their original bids. The way bidders anticipate loser regret is exactly the same as that in
FP. Therefore, the same analysis done for FP applies here, and implies the same equilibrium
strategy.
Similar to SP, in English auction, introducing loser regret into the model is not felt in the
equilibrium since the bidders will increase the bids until their true valuations so the winning
bid will not be a⁄ordable by the ones who lost the auction in the equilibrium.
Remark 8 The loser regret is not felt in the second price and English auctions in equilib-
rium, and hence the expected revenue remains the same as in the traditional case. However,
the loser regret is felt and increases the optimal bid compare to RNNE in ￿rst price and
Dutch auctions, and hence it increases the expected revenue of the seller. To sum up, if the
bidders have loser regret concerns, the expected revenue of the seller is higher in ￿rst price
and Dutch than in second-price and English.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that overbidding in ￿rst price is driven from the anticipation of
regret. The bidders who did not get the object may regret their bids after they learn the
winner￿ s bid and anticipation of this situation may make them bid more aggressively. We
23provide a theoretical basis by considering regretful bidders who bids in the equilibrium more
than RNNE. Experimental results suggest that bidders can indeed anticipate loser regret.
On the other hand, the bidders do not anticipate winner regret and hence do not re￿ ect
these feelings into their bids. In the experiment, in the case where the second highest bid
would be told to the winner, but the winner￿ s bid would not be told to the bidders who did
not get the object, no overbidding is observed. Indeed, the bids are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from the RNNE. Since the bidders did not anticipate the regret, our theory also predicts the
RNNE.
From a di⁄erent point of view, regret might be related to the externalities where the
utility of the bidders a⁄ected by the other factors other than their own valuations and bids.
Auctions with externalities is not a new concept, and it has been discussed fairly in the
literature. For example, John Morgan, Ken Steigletz and George Reis (2003) considered the
externality in the form of a spiteful motive. The utility of the winner a⁄ects the utility of
the losing bidders as a negative externality. Alternatively, identity of the bidders may create
an externality, in other words who won the object may a⁄ect the utility of the other bidders
(see e.g. Philippe Jehiel, Benny Moldovanu and Ennio Stachetti, 1996, 1999; and Jehiel and
Moldovanu, 2000).
The major distinction between regret and externality literature is that regret is an ex-
ternality created by the bidder himself rather than a spiteful motive. In our setting, the
bidder is not dissatis￿ed by the identity of winner or the winner￿ s payo⁄, but rather he is
dissatis￿ed from the possibility of losing the object at an a⁄ordable price. Nonetheless, our
survey results suggest that envy is also a signi￿cantly anticipated when the bidders thought
that they were going to lose.
24In conclusion, we considered an anticipated emotion -regret- in a game theoretical setup
- ￿rst price auction. More generally, regret might be felt in any Bayesian game due to
di⁄erences between ex-ante and ex-post optimal decisions. It might be a fruitful exercise to
apply regret idea on general Bayesian games.
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APPENDIX 
Instructions for the Experiment: 
Introduction 
This is an experiment on the economics of market decision making.  The following 
instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you may 
earn a considerable amount of money.  
During the experiment your payoff will be in experimental dollars that will be converted 
into dollars at the end of the experiment at the following rate: 
2 Experimental Dollars = 1 US Dollar 
Payments will be made privately at the end of the experiment. 
Your Experimental Task 
As you arrive in the lab, you will be randomly divided  into markets consisting of 4 
people each.  Your role in this market is as a bidder to bid for a fictitious commodity.  
At the beginning of the experiment, you will receive a sheet of paper on which you will 
see a list of 10 numbers.  Each number is between 0 and 100 Experimental Dollars (randomly 
drawn with equal probability) and has been rounded to the nearest cent.  Each number 
represents a possible valuation that you may have for the fictitious commodity.  The process 
of selecting possible valuations is exactly the same for everyone.  So, each member of your 
market will have a different list of 10 numbers; each is drawn randomly and independent of 
yours. 
For each of your 1 0 possible valuations, you should write down a bid in the space 
provided on the sheet of paper.  After all of the participants have chosen their bids for each of 
the 10 possible values, the lists will be collected.   27 
 
At this point we will determine each player’s actual value.  The process is as follows.  
The experimenter has 10 cards numbered from 1 to 10.  At the end of the experiment, one of 
you will randomly select one of these cards, and the number selected will determine each 
subject’s valuation.  For example, if the number 4  is selected, it means that your true 
valuation is given by the fourth number that was on your list, and the bid is the corresponding 
fourth number that you wrote.  Hence, you should enter each bid as if that value is going to 
be your true value.   
We are now ready to determine the winner and the payoffs.  The person in each market 
with the highest bid wins the fictitious good and pays the exact amount of his or her bid. In 
the case of a tie, the winner will be determined randomly by rolling a dice.   If you are the 
highest bidder, you will earn the difference between your true value and your bid.  If you are 
not the highest bidder, you will not earn any money.  Hence, your earnings can be described 
as follows: 
 
Earnings  =  your true value  -  your bid  
  (if you are the highest bidder or win the draw in case of a tie) 
 
Earnings  =  0 
  (if you are the low bidder or lose the draw in case of a tie) 
 
Are there any questions? 28 
Information Structures:  
1.  The following is given only to the participants in the loser regret condition: 
After the lists have been collected and a winner determined, you will learn whether you 
are the winner or not, and also YOU WILL LEARN THE HIGHEST BID.      Any other 
information regarding the bids of the other bidders will not be given.  
 
Now, please write your bids for each possible valuation.  
 
2.  The following is given only to the participants in the winner regret condition: 
After the lists have been collected and a winner determined,  
if you are the winner, you will learn that you won, and also you will learn the SECOND 
HIGHEST BID;  
if you are not the winner, you will only learn that you did not win. You will not learn any 
additional information.  
 
Now, please write your bids for each possible valuation.  
 
3.  The following is given only to the participants in the no regret condition: 
After the lists have been collected and a winner determined, you will only learn whether 
you are the winner or not.  You will not learn any additional information.  
 
Now, please write your bids for each possible valuation.  
 29 
An Example of Bidding List:  
  Possible Valuations  Your Bids 
1  98.38   
2  48.07   
3  94.37   
4  61.86   
5  61.23   
6  11.55   
7  45.28   
8  77.54   
9  88.43   
10  22.16   30 
Survey: 
1.  Loser regret condition: 
Suppose at the end you are not the winner, and you learn the highest bid.  Please rate the 
intensity of the emotions listed below you anticipate experiencing in that situation: 
2.  Winner regret condition: 
Suppose at the end you are the winner, and you learn the second highest bid.  Please rate 
the intensity of the emotions listed below you anticipate experiencing in that situation: 
3.  No regret condition: 
a.  Winning: 
Suppose at the end you are the winner, and you did not learn any additional 
information.  Please rate the intensity of the emotions listed below you anticipate 
experiencing in that situation: 
 
b.  Losing: 
Suppose at the end you are not the winner, and you did not learn any additional 
information.  Please rate the intensity of the emotions listed below you anticipate 
experiencing in that situation: 
 
   
 
 31 
Survey Table: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
Not at 
all                      
Very 
much 
Anger                            
Elation                            
Envy                            
Happiness                            
Irritation                            
Regret                            
Relief                            
Sadness                            
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34NOTES:
1. In a single person decision making problem, regret is capable of explaining some
paradoxes, such as Allais paradox and preference reversal phenomenon (see Bell (1982) for
a detailed analysis).
2. To see this, take the derivative of
v Z
v
XG0(X)dX
G(v) = bFPwr(v) + E[h(bFPwr(v) ￿ bFPwr(X))jX < v] with respect to v.
3. To see this take the derivative of
v Z
v
X(N￿1)FN￿2(X)f(X)dX
FN￿1(v) = bFPlr(v) ￿
v Z
v
g(y￿b(y))(N￿1)FN￿2(y)f(y)dy
FN￿1(v) with respect to v.
4. See appendix for the instructions of the experiment.
5. A subject in the laboratory was asked to pick a card without looking from a deck
of cards numbered 1 to 10. The number on the selected card determined which valuations,
and the corresponding bids in the submitted lists were going to be considered as the true
valuations and actual bids of the subjects. For example if the randomly selected card said 4
on it, then the 4th line in the lists became the true valuation of each participant.
6. The conversion rate was 1USD = 2 Experimental Dollars.
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Figure 1 - The Average Bids for the Corresponding Valuations for No Regret, Winner
Regret, and Loser Regret Conditions
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